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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ANNOTATIONS
SECTION 1-201. General Definitions
Subject to additional definitions contained in the subsequent Articles
of this Act which are applicable to specific Articles or Parts thereof, and
unless the context otherwise requires, in this Act:
(19) "Good faith" means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction
concerned.
(25) A person has "notice" of a fact when
(a) he has actual knowledge of it; or
(b) he has received a notice or notification of it; or
(c) from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the time
in question he has reason to know that it exists.
A person "knows" or has "knowledge" of a fact when he has actual
knowledge of it. "Discover" or "learn" or a word or phrase of similar
import refers to knowledge rather than to reason to know. The time and
circumstances under which a notice or notification may cease to be ef-
fective are not determined by this Act.
CASES ANNOTATED UNDER OTHER SECTIONS
NORMAN V. WORLD WIDE DISTRIII. INC.
— Pa. Super. —, 195 A.2d 115 (1963)
See the Annotation to Section 3-302 (1), infra.
ARTICLE 2: SALES
SECTION 2-204. Formation in General
(1) A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner suf-
ficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recog-
nizes the existence of such a contract.
(2) An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale may be
found even though the moment of its making is undetermined.
(3) Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale
does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a con-
tract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate
remedy.
CASES ANNOTATED UNDER OTHER SECTIONS
tBRUCE LINCOLN-MERCURY, INC. V. UNIVERSAL C.I.T. CREDIT CORP.
325 F.2d 2 (3d Cir. 1963)
See the Annotation to Section 9-102, infra.
SECTION 2-302. Unconscionable Contract or Clause
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of
the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
t Based on 1953 Code.
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may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the applica-
tion of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or
any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a
reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting,
purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination.
CASES ANNOTATED UNDER OTHER SECTIONS
* SUTTER V. ST. CLAIR MOTORS, INC.
- Ill. App. —, 194 N.E.2d 674 (1963)
See the Annotation to Section 2-316, infra.
SECTION 2-316. Exclusion or Modification of Warranties
COMMENT
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty
and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be con-
strued wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject to
the provisions of this Article on parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 2-202)
negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such construction is
unreasonable.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied war-
ranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention
merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to ex-
clude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by
a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of
fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are no warranties
which extend beyond the description on the face hereof.",
ANNOTATION
*SUTTER V. ST. CLAIR MOTORS, INC.
- Ill. App. 2d —, 194 N.E.2d 674 (1963)
A farmer bought an automobile from defendant dealer which warranted
in writing that the automobile and all parts thereof were free, under normal
usage, from defects in material and workmanship for 4,000 miles or 90 days,
whichever came first. This warranty was "expressly in lieu of all other war-
ranties, express or implied, and of all other obligations or liabilities on the
part of the dealer." On the day of and during the seven months following
delivery, the car often became inoperable and underwent at least major re-
pairs, adjustments and alterations, none of which resulted in its proper opera-
tion. Finally, the plaintiff had the automobile towed to the dealer's place of
business and demanded the return of his money.
Upon the dealer's refusal to reimburse him, plaintiff brought an action
to recover the purchase price of the car and his repair costs, for the seven
* Code construed but did not govern the case.
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month period, contending that the defendant had breached the implied war-
ranty that the automobile would be reasonably fit for the purpose bought
as provided by Section 15 of the Uniform Sales Act. The trial court dis-
missed, holding that the express warranty excluded the implied warranty of
fitness.
On appeal, the court reversed, holding that the express warranty did not
bar the plaintiff from his implied warranty since the express warranty was
not inconsistent with the implied warranty of fitness as provided under Sec-
tion 15(6) of the Uniform Sales Act. The court added that the same result
would be reached under Section 2-316 of the UCC.
COMMENT
The court imposed onto the applicable USA provisions a "conspicuity"
standard as provided in UCC Section 2-316 and also spoke in terms of "un-
conscionability" as described in UCC Section 2-302 even though such terms
are not found in the Uniform Sales Act. The court was correct in its reasoning
that Section 2-316 would not permit the dealer's implied warranty of mer-
chantability (that the car be fit for the ordinary purposes for which it is sold)
to be negatived by the express warranty extended by the dealer. Section
2-316(2) provides that in order to exclude the warranty of merchantability,
the language used must specifically disclaim the merchantability warranty.
The dealer's express warranty "in lieu of all other warranties" obviously
lacked any such specific reference.
Section 2-316(2) further provides the proper method to exclude an im-
plied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. This implied warranty can
be excluded by an express conspicuous disclaimer which is in writing. Under
Section 2-317(c), unless a contrary intent is shown, an express inconsistent
warranty should not be construed so as to displace an implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose. This is a much more liberal disclaimer provi-
sion than that applied to exclude an implied warranty of merchantability.
Confusion may arise from this court's reference to the dealer's implied war-
ranty of fitness in light of this distinction within Section 2-316.
The court's disregarding the distinction between limitation of a warranty
and limitation of remedy, as well as the construction and disclaimer sections
of the USA, is an inexactness which should be and is easily avoided under the
Code. Section 2-316 provides the methods available for the parties to limit
or disclaim warranties, while Section 2-317 sets forth the manner in which
multiple warranties are to be construed; Sections 2-718 and 2-719 make
provision for contractual limitation of remedy for damages arising out of a
breach
T.H.T.
SECTION 2-317. Cumulation and Conflict of Warranties
Express or Implied
Warranties whether express or implied shall be construed as con-
sistent with each other and as cumulative, but if such construction is un-
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reasonable the intention of the parties shall determine which warranty
is dominant. In ascertaining that intention the following rules apply:
(a) Exact or technical specifications displace an inconsistent sample or
model or general language of description.
(b) A sample from an existing bulk displaces inconsistent general
language of description.
(c) Express warranties displace inconsistent implied warranties other
than an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
CASES ANNOTATED UNDER OTHER SECTIONS
*SUTTER V. ST. CLAIR MOTORS, INC.
— Ill. App. —, 194 N.E.2d 674 (1963)
See the Annotation to Section 2-316, supra.
SECTION 2-607. Effect of Acceptance; Notice of Breach;
Burden of Establishing Breach After
Acceptance; Notice of Claim or
Litigation to Person Answerable
Over
(3) Where a tender has been accepted
(a) the buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or
should have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach
or be barred from any remedy; and
CASES ANNOTATED UNDER OTHER SECTIONS
MC MEEKIN V. GIMBEL BROS., INC.
223 F. Supp. 896 (W.D. Pa. 1963)
See the Annotation to Section 2-725, infra.
SECTION 2-608. Revocation of Acceptance in Whole
or in Part
(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time
after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and
before any substantial change in condition of the goods which is not
caused by their own defects. It is not effective until the buyer notifies the
seller of it.
CASES ANNOTATED UNDER OTHER SECTIONS
MC MEEKIN V. GIMBEL BROS., INC.
223 F. Supp. 896 (W.D. Pa. 1963)
See the Annotation to Section 2-725, infra.
* Code construed but did not govern the case.
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SECTION 2-718. Liquidation or Limitation of Damages;
Deposits
(1) Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the
agreement but only at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the
anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof
of loss, and the inconvenience or non-feasibility of otherwise obtaining an
adequate remedy. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is
void as a penalty.
CASES ANNOTATED UNDER OTHER SECTIONS
*SLITTER V. ST. CLAIR MOTORS, INC.
— III. App. 2d —, 194 N.E.2d 674 (1963)
See the Annotation to Section 2-316, supra.
SECTION 2-719. Contractual Modification or Limitation
of Remedy
(1) Subject to the provisions 'of subsections (2) and (3) of this section
and of the preceding section on liquidation and limitation of damages,
(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in
substitution for those provided in this Article and may limit or
alter the measure of damages recoverable under this Article,
as by limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the goods and
repayment of the price or to repair and replacement of non-
conforming goods or parts; and
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy
is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the
sole remedy.
(2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail
of its essential purpose, remedy-may be had as provided in this Act. ,
(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the
limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential dam-
ages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie
unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is
not.
CASES ANNOTATED UNDER OTHER SECTIONS
*WORLD PRODS., INC. V. FREIGHT SERVICE, INC.
222 F. Supp. 849 (D.N.J. 1963)
See the Annotation to Section 7-204, infra.
*SUTTER V. ST. CLAIR MOTORS, INC.
— Ill: App. 2d —, 194 N.E.2d 674 (1963)
See the Annotation to Section 2-316, supra.
* Code construed but did not govern the case.
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SECTION 2-725. Statute of Limitations in Contracts for Sale
(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced
within four years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original
agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than
one year but may not extend it.
(2)A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless
of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of
warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a war-
ranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery
of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action
accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.
ANNOTATION
MC MEEKIN V. GIMBEL BROS., INC.
223 F. Supp. 896 (W.D. Pa. 1963)
The plaintiff bought a rotary lawnmower from the defendant retailer in
July 1959. From July 1959 to May 1960 the plaintiff used the mower with-
out incident. On May 28, 1960, while plaintiff mowed his lawn, his five year
old son was hit in the eye by an unknown object which caused loss of sight.
The son's location when hit was in conflict at the trial of the buyer's action
in negligence and breach of warranty against the seller. The trial court
granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict and denied plaintiff's
motion for a new trial.
The court held that the plaintiff had no cause of action in negligence for
he had failed to prove causation or, in any event, to prove that the defendant
had any knowledge of the mower's injurious propensities even if they did
exist. The court summarily dismissed the warranty action based on Sections
2-313 and 2-315 as there was no evidence of an express warranty by the
defendant and since the evidence established that the plaintiff did not rely
on the defendant's skill and judgment in selecting the mower. Finally, the
court concluded, apparently based on Section 2-314 though not mentioned
specifically, that there was no proof of breach of implied warranty of mer-
chantability or fitness for cutting grass. The court stressed that the plaintiff
"utterly failed to meet [his] burden of establishing that the mower was not
of merchantable quality when delivered . . . ."
•
COMMENT
Under Section 2-725(2) a cause of action arising from a breach of war-
ranty accrues when the breach occurs which is upon tender, unless the war-
ranty explicitly extends to future performance, in which case the breach
occurs when the defect is discovered or when it should have been discovered.
Thus, except for an explicit warranty for future performance, a cause of action
accrues and a breach occurs at the same time—tender of delivery. An action
for breach of warranty must be brought within four years after the cause of
action accrues unless the parties had agreed to a shorter limitation. Section
2-725(1).
Section 2-607(3)(a) provides that if the buyer desires to revoke his
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acceptance because of a breach of the sales contract, he must give the seller
notice of the defect within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have
discovered the breach. By reason of Section 2-608(2) the buyer must also
give the seller notice of his revocation within a reasonable time after he dis-
covers or should have discovered the defect under Section 2-608(2). Notice
of revocation of acceptance under Section 2-608(2) must also be given before
there is any substantial change in the condition of the goods not due to
defects attributable to the seller.
R.W.D.
ARTICLE 3: COMMERCIAL PAPER
SECTION 3-302. Holder in Due Course
(1) A holder in due course is a holder who takes the insrtument
(a) for value ; and
(b) in good faith; and
(c) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of
any defense against or claim to it on the part of any person.
ANNOTATION
NORMAN V. WORLD WIDE DISTRIB., INC.
— Pa. Super. —, 195 A.2d 115 (1963)
Plaintiff purchased a breakfront from defendant World Wide with the
added inducement of a referral plan under which plaintiff would be paid five
dollars for each letter he wrote to a friend requesting an appointment with
a salesman of World Wide. The plaintiff signed a purchase agreement and an
attached judgment note in blank. Under the terms of the purchase agreement,
the plaintiff agreed to sign the attached note providing for thirty equal
monthly installments totaling $1,079.40, with the first payment due in forty-
five days. The defendant later inserted in the note the correct amount of
$1,079.40 but it was made payable in three days to "State Wide Products".
Three days later the note was purchased for $831 by Peoples, which, during
the prior year, had purchased similar notes from this company under three
different corporate names. Peoples called the plaintiff to inquire into his
satisfaction with the transaction and to indicate that Peoples in no way bad
anything to do with the referral plan. Plaintiff did not complain about the
transaction at this time. Peoples entered judgment on the note against the
plaintiff. The plaintiff was granted relief in equity against World Wide (no
longer in existence) and Peoples; the sales agreement was rescinded on
grounds of fraud and the holder's judgment on the note was declared void.
Upon appeal, the court affirmed, dismissing Peoples' contention that it
was a holder in due course and should collect on the note despite payee's
fraud. It held that under Pennsylvania case law, since the plaintiff had
entered a defense of fraud against the payee, the holder of the note has the
burden of establishing its claim as a holder in due course, and that Peoples
was not a holder in due course since it did not act in good faith as required
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